SCADA Forensics with Snort IDS by Valli, Craig
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
ECU Publications Pre. 2011 
2009 
SCADA Forensics with Snort IDS 
Craig Valli 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of: Valli, C. (2009). SCADA Forensics with Snort IDS. Proceedings of 
WORLDCOMP2009, Security and Management 2009. (pp. 618-621). Las Vegas, USA: CSREA Press. 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks/529 
Snort IDS for SCADA Networks 
Craig Valli 
secau – Security Research Centre 
School of Computer and Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Mount Lawley WA, Australia 
Abstract - This paper is a research in progress paper 
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control systems networks. 
Keywords: SCADA, Snort, nepenthes, honeyd, honeypot, 
forensics 
1 Introduction
There is a growing discipline of network forensics with 
traditional Ethernet networks running TCP/IP. This is a 
discipline that utilizes networking science to investigate 
problems of network malfeasance both pre and ante 
incident. Packet capture and subsequent interpretation of 
the network dump files of packets and protocols whether 
this be in near real time or post incident provides invaluable 
insights into attacks. The capture files can be replayed and 
analysed until such time as a causation is found for a 
particular incident. 
There are a range of commonly available packet capture 
and analysis utilities available for the modern network 
forensics practitioner. Most of these tools are dominated by 
the analysis of TCP/IP protocol suite and its inherent issues, 
whether these issues be at the actual packet level reaching 
through various protocols up to the final presentation of the 
network stream at the application layer.  From this plethora 
of  available open source and commercial tools there are a 
limited number of tools that natively tackle the protocols 
that are in the SCADA domain such as ModBUS, DNP3. 
This research is aimed at utilizing relevant open source 
tools namely Wireshark, Etherape and Snort IDS to provide 
a platform for detecting, reporting, capturing, analyzing and 
ameliorating network borne threats to SCADA and control 
systems networks. An extension to this work is planned in 
that once these threats and modes of compromise are better 
known and understood then the development of customized 
detection modules for deployment in honeypots namely 
honeyd and nepenthes is planned. 
Throughout the remainder of the paper the term SCADA 
will be used to encompass all protocols and systems used to 
control SCADA and industrial control system networks. 
2 The need to protect SCADA 
There is little argument that SCADA and control networks 
need protections from network borne attacks or 
malfeasance. There are a range of documented issues 
relating to SCADA or control system networks. The reports 
from various agencies indicate that SCADA systems as 
highly vulnerable to attack or compromise that would result 
in catastrophic failure of national critical infrastructures and 
ultimately the economic well being of that nation.  
SCADA and control system networks drive much of the 
wealth generation processes of the modern industrial 
complex. Many of these systems are used to run the modern 
industrial complexes that supply modern Western nations 
with many of the services and goods that they take for 
granted.  These systems are to be found in but not limited to 
petroleum complexes, power generation grids, water supply 
networks, sewerage networks and most other complex 
systems that require constant computer-based monitoring or 
control. Compromise or even minor disruption to these 
systems could have catastrophic outcomes and downstream 
consequences resulting in massive economic impact or 
significant loss of life[1-5]. 
Significant disruption to any one of these critical 
infrastructures through deliberate attack or inadvertent 
attacks such as the SQL slammer worm [4] can inflict 
catastrophic long term economic damage to that goes well 
beyond the cost of the material damage to the infrastructure 
itself. Disruption of gas services as result of an industrial 
mishap in Western Australia alone in 2008 almost saw that 
States economy grind to a halt [3]. The loss of capacity at ~ 
40% was sufficient to have considerable downstream 
effects that for instance caused laundry for hospitals to be 
shipped in from other Australian states until increased 
supplies could be obtained. 
SCADA devices/systems are built to run, monitor or control 
a particular process typically as a part of combined 
automated process that results in a “product”. Many of 
these devices and systems in which they operate are 
intended to run for the life of the project, mine or product 
cycle which can be decades not weeks. As a result SCADA 
systems have a larger than expected level of legacy 
hardware and software installed, the old engineering adage 
if it is not broken do not fix it was a paragon in many of 
these systems. This was a perfectly acceptable paradigm in 
which to operate when many of these companies/entities 
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did not connect to any network except their own production 
or engineering network, and were never connected to the 
corporate network that is then possibly connected to the 
Internet. This phenomenon has now changed as smaller 
companies merge and combine to become bigger entities as 
the pressure of globalisation and economic rationalisation 
increase. This leads to network infrastructures that are often 
comprised of different disjointed legacy network systems. 
Further adding to the entropy with respect to the security 
stability is the attachment of the corporate network and the 
increasing use of the Internet as a backbone network into 
the vanguard of SCADA networks. 
Many older SCADA and control systems were proprietary 
systems with protected proprietary protocols and related 
processes. These legacy systems are now being upgraded 
and are being moved to open platform systems that utilise 
open protocols such as Distributed Network Protocol 3 
(DNP3).  New generation SCADA systems also use modern 
open standard communications protocols and networks to 
provide access to the SCADA systems for control and 
command. These networks even if totally private will 
almost atypically run the TCP/IP range of protocols and 
supporting services. Many providers due to costs are also 
replacing dedicated hard physical links to control/command 
interfaces commonly refererred to as HMI (Human 
Machine Interfaces) with ethernet or wireless links. 
Consequently, some of this SCADA or control traffic may 
actually travel on or rely upon open networks such as the 
Internet to provide these control conduits that were once 
private and fixed. Of greater risk is that some of these 
systems utilise open protocol wireless systems such as 
2.4Ghz WiFi for these command and control conduits. 
Various reports as far back as the late 1990s have indicated 
the need for better diligence when dealing with these 
systems. The knowledge of SCADA vulnerability is now 
spreading into the hacker or blackhat communities with 
systems such as the Metasploit framework having several 
specific SCADA exploits now installed for use and 
available publicly. One of the problems is that the SCADA 
community still believes that security via obscurity, the 
keeping of a secret in this increasingly inter-connected and 
global world is a viable and sustainable option.   
3 The research approach 
This research is aimed at providing a working framework 
for testing, modifying and where possible providing remedy 
for known and published vulnerability of SCADA and 
control systems. It does not seek nor does it not intend to 
provide a platform for exploit development. This quasi-
experimental research is aimed at producing systems 
hardened against incursions from would be attackers using 
known vulnerability or exploit to penetrate systems or 
simply to disrupt systems. Later on when combined with 
honeypot technologies the ability to track or capture zero 
day exploits will also be a possibility.  
The two main protocols that will be initially examined in 
this research are ModBUS and DNP3. It is not the intent of 
this paper to provide an in depth analysis of DNP3 or 
ModBUS protocols. These types of open protocol will be 
used increasingly as a result of the growing convergence of 
technologies and the business imperatives to have these 
types of supporting systems for billing and asset control. It 
should be noted that in the SCADA and control systems 
space there is the use of various proprietary protocols and 
they are not well represented at this stage in the open source 
community. The research approach is to produce a robust 
method and architecture for forensic examination of 
network borne threats using DNP3 and ModBUS as vectors 
and then apply lessons learned over other less known 
protocols in the space.  
Experimental Procedure for Snort SCADA 
1.Environmental Scanning
This will include scanning of blackhat, hacker, 
vendor and CERT sites for vulnerability 
announcements or trace. The only restriction is 
that the exploit be network borne, it does not 
specifically have to attack the underlying network 
protocol but could also be malicious payload or 
instructions for a PLC. 
2.Production of Replay/Replication of vulnerability
This stage will involve the production of the 
vulnerability for replay via a script or code base 
preferably. This also allows for easy testing and 
verification of the exploit. 
3.Analysis of vulnerability 
This is the extended analysis of the modus 
operandi of the exploit. Seeing what limits or 
bounds are contained in the vulnerability/exploit 
itself.
4.Creation of IDS rulesets 
There are 3 sub-stages for this stage. At some 
stages of the process it may only be able to achieve 
identification i.e the attack is unstoppable  
a. to identify 
b. to reduce/stop attack 
c. extensive logging 
5.Testing of the ruleset 
Testing of the ruleset for resilience when under 
sustained attack. 
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Unlike IDS rule development that we currently use for 
reducing or eliminating risk the SCADA or control systems 
space has some unique requirements. In conventional 
IDS/IPS a perfectly acceptable paradigm is the denial 
access for the malicious packets either by dropping them or 
dropping the routing for the packets. This modus operandii
for a number of reasons is not acceptable in the SCADA 
environment. Due to the requirement for most SCADA 
systems need to have regular and continual communication 
between devices and controllers a denial of route or packet 
may cause a system to fail or shutdown at best. Failure to 
communicate to a device in a SCADA network may have 
catastrophic downstream consequences. 
4 Experimental Environment 
For each identified attack the attack is perpetrated against a 
simple experimental network as designed below. The 
100Mb hub and use of the same subnet in this case 
192.168.1.0/24 allowing for the promiscuous sniffing of 
network traffic by various utilities. The network machines 
are a combination of VMWare instances and physical 
hardware that as previously mentioned could be rapidly 
redeployed. All machines are time synchronized by ntp 
services to the same timestamp before the start of an 
experimental run. 
Victim/Target Machine 
This is constructed as a raw default installed machine but 
where possible live configurations will be obtained from 
SCADA and control systems users/operators. Failing the 
availability of sample live configurations then the default 
configuration from the software vendors will be deployed 
for testing.  
For each victim or target machine where possible 
performance logging and monitoring will be gathered to aid 
forensic analysis, but not at the expense of experimental 
situation reflecting operational realities. Preferably all 
logging or system logging will go out on another network 
interface separate to the one being sniffed as indicate in the 
network design. 
Snort IDS 
A VMWare based image based on Debian was developed. 
The Snort IDS system used the base network install for i386 
platform. Then the Snort IDS with PostgreSQL database 
extensions was installed. In addition Wireshark, tcpdump 
and Etherape were installed. Several Snort IDS analysis 
frontends were installed with the primary interface being 
the ACID/BASE hybrid frontend. The system also had X 
Windows installed although strictly not used on secure 
production servers its use and installation enabled faster 
analysis of the experiments. The final system is used as a 
baseline system for each experimental run undertaken. This 
has allowed a consistent approach to the experimentation 
and a reduction of compounding variables in that the 
experiments all start with same software and configurations. 
Where a Snort IDS ruleset was in existence this was utilized 
to initially detect the attack upon replay of packets that 
should be addressed by the IDS ruleset. Where no rule 
existed rule development is taken as per stage 4 of the 
experimental procedure which is produce a ruleset to 
identify, then extend (where possible) a ruleset to 
ameliorate or stop, and then an extended ruleset to observe 
and document the attack more thoroughly.  
Network Sniffer/Forensic Collector 
This is a VMware instance that is a forensic collector 
designed to forensically capture all network traffic and 
response generated. The system simply creates a tcpdump 
binary capture file of the network sessions for later analysis 
via various tools and techniques.  
Snort IDSSniffer
Forensic Collector 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.2
Victim
192.168.1.20
Attacker
192.168.1.30
100Mbit Hub
Figure 1: Network Design
External System Logger
Ad-hoc Secondary Network 
Link for System logging
Attacker 
This is typically a simple Debian base installation with 
scripting languages and appropriate attack tools installed to 
realize the attack. On occasion the use of bootable Linux 
CD security implementations such as Backtrack will be 
used as the attack platform. All attacks are preferably 
executed from a script or compiled code base for 
consistency of attack profile or mode of operation. 
5 Discussion
This is a research project that is in progress. The aim of the 
project is to produce a reliable technological framework for 
the investigation of network borne threats to SCADA and 
control system environments. The framework will allow for 
production of Snort signatures for the SCADA and control 
systems environments using open source tools as the 
platform. This is the first stage in the development of a 
hardened network architecture for SCADA and control 
systems. 
From these forensically verified signatures the development 
of emulation scripts for deployment in the honeyd honeypot 
system will be undertaken. Honeyd also has a tarpitting 
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capability that can be used to slow down or resource 
exhaust an attacker. The principle modus operandii for this 
honeypot will be competent emulation of a SCADA system 
with vulnerability.  
In addition it is planned to where applicable to create 
specific vulnerability modules for use with the nepenthes 
honeypot system as well. Nepenthes honeypot is designed 
to principally collect malicious codes in the form of 
shellcode or custom built binaries. It does this by fooling an 
attacker into believing they have exploited the machines 
vulnerability and can “oWn” the machine by the download 
and execution of malicious code. Nepenthes via its 
emulation of actions makes the attacker or bot surrender the 
malcode. These two honeypots will allow a significant 
opportunity to provide a defence in depth approach to 
protecting these networks and network protocols from 
known attacks and vulnerabilities. It will also provide the 
ability to track zero day exploits or vulnerabilities. 
Honeypots
IDS
Firewall
Asset
By producing the honeypot layers and IDS they will take 
load off of the systems and also isolate response away from 
critical assets. The integration and layering of defence from 
the firewall to IDS to honeypot should produce a highly 
resilient architecture to attacks on SCADA systems. 
6 Conclusion
There is strong evidence that the installation of a hardened, 
up to date IDS system that is placed at the network 
perimeter or intersection can yield significant protection for 
networks. The problem is manifest in making sure that the 
IDS is current and hardened against known exploits.  
This research aims to provide a reliable system for the rapid 
production of IDS rulesets for amelioration of threat to 
SCADA and control networks. It will extend the resilience 
by combining firewall – IDS – honeypot integration and 
awareness of exploits and vulnerability. These three 
technologies should provide a hardened series of barriers by 
chaining and tight integration of defensive technologies. 
The further research to use the identified attacks in 
honeypot technology should allow significant protection 
from would be attackers or mishap principally as a tarpit 
technology but also as a collector of attack modes and 
motivations. These can then be examined and used to 
further harden network defences by the production of new 
IDS rules. 
This combination of open source technologies, SCADA 
operator knowledge and targeted vulnerability and exploit 
research should produce a hardened resilient infrastructure 
for use by the SCADA community with the end result being 
critical infrastructures better protected from cyber attack. 
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